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Voters care about government formation even when the
landscape is fragmented and coalition signals are ambiguous
or absent
Advocates of proportional representation often claim that a reformed electoral system would eliminate the need
for tactical voting, along the lines we are currently seeing the UK general election. Drawing on evidence from
Belgium, Tom Verthé, Stefanie Beyens, Fernanda Flacco, Louise Nikolic, argue that voters do care about
government and coalition formation even when the political and electoral landscape is fragmented, and coalition
signals are ambiguous or even absent.
What reasons do voters have to
act strategically in a proportional
electoral system like the Belgian
one? In a multiparty PR system,
voters are never in a position to
vote strategically in the
conventional sense of the word
(keeping a less-preferred party
from executive power): Belgian
coalition formations happen after
the elections and are a party
prerogative. However, the
complex nature of multiparty PR
systems still allows for strategic
voting: not voting for your
preferred party in order to
influence the election outcome
and, in this case, the post-
electoral coalition formation
game.
After considering which coalitions are possible or likely, a rational voter might weigh the odds of potential
outcomes and policy compromises against each other. Voters can be tempted to abandon their preferred party
because they think it does not stand a chance to participate in the next government coalition. Or they might do so
because their preferred party actually has a high chance of getting into government, but the most likely coalition
partner is one they particularly dislike, which would result in a compromise that would be too far removed from
their own preferred policy positions.
Elections remain first and foremost mechanisms for government selection. Downs claimed this might be too
complex a task in a PR context, yet Blais et al showed in 2006 that this ‘pessimistic conclusion’ is false in the case
of the 2003 Israeli elections (see also this 2009 article by Bargsted & Kedar). Similar research has shown that
there are a number of other PR systems (like Canada, Germany, The Netherlands and Austria) where a
substantial share of the voting population either votes insincerely or strategically.
So far strategic coalition voting has not been studied in Belgium. In 2014 Belgian voters went to the polls for EU,
federal and regional elections, all on the same day. This case has some features that might make it the least likely
place to witness strategic voting behaviour, fuelling Downs’ pessimistic predictions. The party landscape has
become hyper-fragmented (the previous federal government consisted of 6 parties, the current federal parliament
hosts 13 parties) and almost every party has credible coalition potential. The Belgian federal structure further
complicates the coalition formation process, since the country – apart from the Brussels capital region – is divided
into two separate party systems based on the French and Dutch language groups and these need to be
represented in the federal government coalition.
Needless to say that this presents even the most rational of voters with quite a challenge. However, we argue the
opposite: because of its complexity Belgium presents voters with a myriad of ways to vote strategically. Our
results, based on data from the 2014 PartiRep Voter Survey (www.partirep.eu), indeed show that even in Belgium
strategic coalition voting is alive and well and that parties’ perceived coalition potential influence vote intentions for
the federal elections.
Our paper started from the observation that not all voters adhere to the simple logic of voting for the party they
most prefer. This might seem odd on the surface, but we set out to show that a substantial part of these insincere
voters are in fact acting in accordance with their preferences, they just take into account that not all parties have
an equal chance of becoming part of the executive. These voters want to avoid the risk of wasting their vote, not
only by voting for a party that might not get into parliament, but also by voting for a party that will end up on the
opposition benches. At the core, the underpinning dynamic is the same wasted-vote logic. Using parties’
perceived coalition potential as an instrument, we tried to determine how many voters actually take coalition
considerations into account.
In our survey sample we see that about one in four voters with a clearly preferred party deviates from their
preference and intend to vote for another one. Looking at the parties that are confronted with more insincere
voting we can already see a pattern: traditional parties are less inflicted than smaller, newer or ideologically more
extreme ones, with N-VA (Flemish regionalists) as an exception. Being an insincere voter might, however, be a
prerequisite for strategic voting, it is not equivalent. To establish the role coalition considerations play in vote
choice we followed two different paths.
First we tried to examine if coalition considerations have an effect on vote intentions or not.  By transforming our
data we could perform a conditional logit model that examined whether perceived coalition potential has an
independent and significant effect on vote choice over and above other variables like ideological distance, party
evaluations and some other case-specific control variables (The case-specific control variables are: gender, age,
income, education level, political interest and sophistication). Our results indeed show that both in Flanders and
Wallonia a higher perceived coalition potential increases the odds for voting for that party (an odds ratio of 1.2 for
Flanders and 1.4 for Wallonia).
Our indirect approach thus confirmed what we already expected: voters take into account whether parties have a
credible chance of making it into government when deciding whom to vote for. There are, however, also limits to
this indirect approach. It establishes that coalition potential per se matters, but it does not give us any information
on which voters effectively let these considerations sway their vote on an individual level. In order to identify this
group we turned to a more direct method. The first step was to filter out sincere voters. It is entirely possible that
certain sincere voters intend to vote for the party they like most because they expect that it is very likely that it will
be part of the executive.
These voters are not included in our estimate, which most likely makes it an underestimation of the extent of
actual coalition voting. The second condition was based on the relationship between the party the respondent
intends to vote for and the one he/she prefers. When the coalition potential of the vote intention is higher than that
of the preferred party, we consider this group of respondents strategic coalition voters. In Flanders the share of
coalition voters is conservatively estimated at 6,2%, in Wallonia the number is slightly lower: 5,5%. This might not
seem a lot, but the spoils are not evenly distributed among parties. Some parties profit from strategic voting,
others lose a substantial amount of their potential electorate, even when the electoral threshold does not threaten
them.
The green parties on either side of the language border suffer tremendously from coalition voting and lose more
than one fifth of their electoral base. Taking coalition considerations out of the picture, we see that that some
parties gain a few percentage points while others lose some. In a highly fragmented party landscape these
differences suffice to impact the leverage parties have when it comes to coalition formation.
Our (conservative) estimates also raise some normative questions. If voters are capable and willing to weigh their
preferences and decide whether they prefer to vote for the party they like best or deviate from this by picking a
party that sufficiently combines ideas with the ability to transform them into policy as part of the executive, is it not
up to political parties to present them with clear information? In Belgium coalition signals are almost a taboo, while
everyone knows coalitions are unavoidable. The multi-layered federal structure doesn’t make things easy for
political parties: they need to look for a sufficient number of partners in order to get a majority, both within and
outside of their own language group. Furthermore, they also need to take into account the political majorities on
other levels of government. This doesn’t, however, absolve parties from their duties. They themselves could take
the lead and bring about order among the chaos.
Now parties wait for the signal of the voter, as if it were the responsibility of Flemish and Walloon voters to
coordinate coalition formation. This might be confusing and frustrating for voters who do care – and rightly so –
about what will happen with their vote after leaving the polling station. Would voters reward parties that show their
hand and penalize those who don’t, or would the result be exactly the same as it is now?
We do not have an answer to this question. Pre-electoral coalitions/alliances were in vogue for a while about a
decade ago, but they were never used as instruments to present viable coalition alternatives to the electorate. The
main lesson we learn from this paper is an encouraging one: voters care about government formation even when
the landscape is fragmented and coalition signals are ambiguous or absent. It is up to parties to decide whether to
cater to this or to ignore it and keep their hands free for (a few hundred days of) coalition bargaining.
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